Wednesday 12 November 2008

SADC mediation failure in Zimbabwe: Options for the MDC

It would have been quite remarkable if the Southern Africa development Community (SADC) had made a significantly different ruling to what they did over the weekend in the latest round of mediation talks on Zimbabwe. The problem is not really that they made a decision which clearly favoured Mr Mugabe’s position and undermined Mr Tsvangirai’s. I do not believe that these leaders had any choice really but to endorse what Mr Mbeki had proposed and the SADC’s own Organ on Politics and Security had endorsed a fortnight previously.

The problem is that the SADC has to be seen to protect this much fractured agreement which is a product of undemocratic and dictatorial considerations rather than the observance of democratic values and principles. The latter were discarded when the region failed to uphold and protect the vote of the people which was delivered on March 29. Everything that has happened since, including the much discredited June 27 elections, has been about reversing the people’s verdict and protecting a rejected president and his defeated party.

The agreement signed on September 16 should have been a product of compromise by the then opposition which had secured a parliamentary majority and a handsome lead in the presidential ballot, notwithstanding that such results had been compromised by failure of timeous disclosure and overt manipulation. The government of national unity emanating from the agreement should thus have reflected the MDC as the lead party which, through its magnanimity, had embraced and accommodated its vanquished opponents. Unfortunately the reverse is now the reality – the vanquished has accommodated the victor. This would be laughable if it were not so tragic.

In years to come historians will debate and analysts will sift through evidence to establish how and why the parties, particularly the MDC which is now patently disadvantaged, ever agreed to this deal in the first place. But that is a matter for the future. The reality of now is that the agreement is in place and the issue to consider is what are the options of the two major parties going forward. I believe that for Zanu-PF the choices are much straighter forward. Armed with a mandate from the SADC, Mr Mugabe can now proceed to establish his government with or without the MDC. Having secured what they have always wanted – recognition and legitimacy – there is neither the incentive nor the will for Zanu-PF to continue with the negotiations.

The outcome for proceeding along that route is not going to be much more different from what is already on the ground. Political isolation and economic deterioration will continue, but so what? Zanu-PF know that they have managed quite well for eight years and so can manage for another few years at least. The situation may be much tougher for the citizens but they really don’t care as long as their power is secure. More money will be printed, diamonds will be mined and traded illegally, more commercial farms will be taken over and more deals will be struck. They will continue to prosper and, at the very least, they will survive quite comfortably. So by the end of this week or next, it is quite likely that Mr Mugabe will announce a new cabinet to run the government.

For the MDC I believe there are three clear options going forward. The first is to capitulate and agree to join Mr Mugabe’s government and take whatever portfolios are offered to them. This will mean basically that they accept a junior and not equal role in government and they forfeit the electoral mandate which they secured in March. I think that adopting this option will only serve to confirm the status quo – that Mr Mugabe and Zanu-PF remain in power and that the MDC has failed to wrestle that power away from them.

Taking this option may not be as defeatist as it sounds. If anything, it is a pragmatic choice to make because it is now all too clear that the conditions do not exist for a change of power. The leadership of Zanu-PF will not allow it (remember Mr Mugabe’s “never ever” declarations?), the military leadership will not allow it (remember the “not saluting anyone but Mugabe” declaration?) and now the regional leadership will not allow it. It is doubtful whether the AU will offer a different verdict. So what is on offer is the best that can be secured under the circumstances and Mr Tsvangirai will do well to accept and make do with that.

I also think that there are other material and psychological benefits for MDC getting into government even as junior partners - especially if they gain the Ministry of Finance. There is a saying that he who holds the purse strings calls the tune. MDC could leverage the ministries which they control to improve the lives of the people and hence strengthen their position for the next elections. They can also use their positions to monitor what government is doing in the other areas which they do not control and raise the alarms if anything untoward is happening. The fact that the opposition will have a majority in the cabinet will also be a source of comfort and strength. They could use their numerical advantage to counter, overcome or neutralise any Zanu-PF excesses.

The second option is for the MDC to continue to fight for the positions which they crave. This will mean appealing to the AU (which, in my view, is a futile exercise) and ultimately to the UN. If they take this option, they are likely to receive a few more sympathies but I have grave doubts that this will result in anything substantial or fundamental. There is no appetite in the AU to force out or undermine Mr Mugabe because many of the leaders share similar experiences and traits with him. The UN is badly divided over the Zimbabwe issue because of both political and historical circumstances. This option will therefore amount to a longwinded way leading back to the first option – capitulation, or the last option – abandonment.

Yes, abandoning this agreement is the last options which the MDC has. To say that they should not have entered into this agreement in the first place is perhaps stating the obvious. But Mr Tsvangirai now has the real opportunity to walk away from it all if he chooses to do so. Firstly, this may redeem much of the respect and goodwill which he lost as a result of agreeing to this faulty deal. Second it may just help push the economy over the steep cliff from which it is currently tottering. History shows that no party, even one as strong and entrenched as Zanu-PF, can survive a completely collapsed economy. Thirdly, time is on Mr Tsvangirai side and not on Mr Mugabe’s. At 56 Mr Tsvangirai can afford to wait a few more years to get into power. At 86 years of age, Mr Mugabe has precious few years left to hold on to power.

There will be some who will argue that if Mr Tsvangirai withdraws from the agreement this will only prolong and exacerbate the suffering of the people of Zimbabwe. My argument is that the people are already suffering and it is not because of Mr Tsvangirai. Why should he take the responsibility to remove the suffering which he has not caused in the first place? I don’t believe that Mr Tsvangirai should feel guilty or ashamed of pulling out. He may even be hailed as a hero if he does. More importantly he will not be held complicit to the suffering which the people will no doubt continue to experience if there is no genuine sharing of power in government. On balance, I believe that this is the option which the MDC should now take. The suffering will continue for a little longer, but the relief will be much greater.

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