A minefield of a political settlement in Zimbabwe

Make no mistake about it, the just concluded political settlement in Zimbabwe is a very bad deal indeed. It is quite obvious that not many people are happy with the agreement and there are good reasons for that. The newly anointed Prime Minister, Morgan Tsvangirai, will feel that the deal does not give adequate recognition to his success in the much fairer and free March 29, 2008 elections. President Robert Mugabe has already expressed strong reservations about the agreement.

Many supporters of both the MDC and ZANU-PF feel that their leaders “sold out” to achieve the agreement. The international community is generally sceptical that the agreement will be successfully implemented and are withholding support until they see evidence of progress on the ground. I do suspect that even President Thabo Mbeki, the chief architect of the agreement, is privately ashamed of his shoddy handiwork though, in public, he claims that this was the best solution – “an African solution to an African problem” whatever that means!

Be that as it may, the deal provides some hope of sorts that there is light at the end of the tunnel. My own view is that the agreement is a very positive development for three reasons: Firstly, the deal has for the first time in 28 years loosened Mugabe’s stranglehold on power in Zimbabwe. In spite of his fatuous claims that he remains in “the driving seat”, Mugabe knows that he has been compromised and lost a great deal of the powers he once held. Otherwise why would he be trying so hard to sabotage the agreement if he remained truly in charge? The degree of "loosening" may be debatable but the mere fact that Mugabe has agreed to share power represents a significant shift in the power dynamics in Zimbabwe.

Secondly and, again, for the first time since independence in 1980, the opposition now have a significant say in the governing of the country. Although the degree of "say" may be debatable, the MDC are in a position to begin dismantling some of the more oppressive and obnoxious structures, systems and legislation - access to information, security and public order, etc. Zanu-PF will work very hard to sabotage or block any reform efforts but they will not be allowed to succeed. And I suspect they will not allow themselves to succeed. They know that they have got out of this deal much more than they deserved and they will not fare better in a new round of negotiations – especially with Mbeki’s tenure in South Africa under imminent threat.

Third, the deal provides the last possible chance for providing an honourable exit to Mugabe. I do not think Mugabe has any doubt (neither has his party, for that matter) that the game is over and their time is up. They know that they remain in shared power only because of the courtesy of President Mbeki and other African leaders who allowed that he should not be humiliated out of office but should, instead, be given a soft landing. Mbeki and his motley crew of African leaders will not be amused if Mugabe double-crosses them. There are watching him closely and will not let him wriggle out of the deal. And when the next elections come (be it in two years or five) Mugabe and ZANU-PF will be put to the sword by the voters.

Having made a case of some sort in favour of this very fractured agreement, it is my view that there are three potential deadly hazards or minefields that must be negotiated by the parties if any meaningful or useful results are to be expected from this engagement. The first is the distribution of the cabinet positions. One of the major weaknesses of the agreement which has been made public so far is that it does not specify how the cabinet positions are to be allocated. I do suspect that this would have been discussed and agreed at the negotiating table but the fact that it was not committed into the actual agreement document suggests that there could be some back-tracking and shifts from agreed positions. If that is the case, Mr Mbeki should be expected back in Harare on the double before his smouldering agreement goes up in flames. There has been a lot of speculation as to which ministries have been allocated to which party and I do not wish to add to this speculation

My expectation however is that the MDC will be given some key and strategic ministries which will lend credibility to the power sharing arrangements and strengthen their hand in the difficult process of turning the economy around. It must be remembered that apart from the fact that they actually won the March general elections, what the MDC brings to the table is their claim to the key to unlock international aid and investment which will be critical in bailing out Zimbabwe from its economic doldrums. However such external support will not be forthcoming unless Tsvangirai is given real power and seen to be in a position and making an effort to change things around. Therefore I see the fair and equitable distribution of cabinet sits as critical to the success of the agreement. Anything else is, potentially, a deal breaker.

The second minefield is the land issue. The terms of the agreement suggest that Mugabe’s chaotic land reforms are irreversible. I am not quite sure what this means but to me this is the most reversible of the issues otherwise there will be no progress whatsoever in improving the lot of the people. I believe that redistribution of land to the landless and the poor is absolutely necessary and I fully agree that the British government should be persuaded to compensate the farmers whose land has been acquired for this purpose as per the terms of the Lancaster House agreement. But it is common knowledge that much of the farms that were taken in the last eight years were given to undeserving government ministers, senior civil servants, top brass of the security agencies and Zanu-PF apparatchiks.

It is absolutely silly and sheer madness to suggest and to expect the British government (and any government for that matter) to pay compensation for lands which are in the hands of such self-serving individuals. In my view the issue of land should be guided by one principle or consideration – effective utilisation of the land for food production and economic development of the country. I believe that many of the farms were too big and this resulted in large tracts of unutilised or underutilised land. Such farms should be subdivided and shared with the landless poor. Others who have the means, capacity and capability should be assisted to acquire their own lands which they can farm. The undeserving apparatchiks should be kicked off the lands which they have forcibly and illegally acquired.

The third minefield that is likely to blow up the agreement is the issue of amnesty for the perpetrators of human rights abuses during the Mugabe era. Whilst the agreement is not prescriptive of the action to be taken in connection with political violence and human rights abuses, the new Prime Minister has indicated that perpetrators will be brought to book. This is a most welcome commitment because, in my view, the physical pain and destruction of life and property that have been perpetrated in the name of Zanu-PF are unpardonable. But the big question is whether Mugabe and Zanu-PF will allow their acolytes to be punished.

These and other challenges and uncertainties remain lurking in the shadows and may trip the deal at any time. And quite obviously, the deal itself is not perfect. But it reminds me that the Lancaster agreement which brought in Mugabe was, in my view, only (or mostly) made possible by the internal settlement of a year or so previously in which Ian Smith agreed to relinquish his power to Bishop Muzorewa. I have always had my doubts whether the Lancaster agreement would have succeeded at the time it did were it not because they were negotiating with Muzorewa rather than the more belligerent and tougher Smith.